Rethinking Salafism Shifting Trends & Changing Typologies Post Arab Spring

The three giants of Salafi Islam. Al-Albani of Jordan, Ibn Uthaymeen of Unais of Arabia, and Ibn Baz the Grand Mufti. These three are considered universally by almost all strands to really be the most significant or the most important Salafi clerics.

They're all passed away obviously in our time, but in the 90s they were considered to be the big three. So he says all three of them are basically in the purist strand.

He then said there's another strand called the politicos.

And the politicos are those who engage in politics through activism and through discussion and dialogue. They want to use the system. They're operating from within the system, and they're not calling for open rebellion.

And of course the main example given of politicos were Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-Awda. So this is the Grand Mufti currently, Abdul Aziz al-Sheikh. And that is Safar al-Hawali, sorry that is Salman al-Awda who is currently in jail because of a tweet that he made last year.

So that's an example of a politico. That's somebody who's trying to change the system from within the system, very actively engaged in politics.

And then of course the final strand was that of the jihadist strand.

And of course the article came out in 2005. So obviously the obvious example was al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.

So Wiktorowicz's categorization became and to a large extent remains the industry standard within the Salafi academic, Western academic world.

It is still quoted to this day. And you will find people still mentioning purist politicos and jihadists as if Wiktorowicz is basically still the given. However of course there have been other attempts as well.

Zoltan Paul's Categories

I'll just briefly mention two of them. Zoltan Paul, back in 2013, he wrote a book as well about Salafis. And he attempted to categorize Salafis into two main categories.

Under each of the two main there were two subdivisions, so you have four categories. There was two main, under each one there was two. So 1A, 1B, 2A, 2B.

And he categorized Salafis once again, very similar to Wiktorowicz. It's as if Wiktorowicz was the first domino and everybody else that came is kind of sort of stuck and wed to that paradigm. So Zoltan Paul categorized Salafis into two, and as I said each two is further subdivided into two.

The two main ones were purists and halakhis or activists. So purists, straight from Wiktorowicz, and halakhis or activists, which is basically politicals. However, he said purists are divided into two categories.

This is not Wiktorowicz, this is Paul. Purists are divided into two categories, he said. The first of them, he said, were those who are rejectionists to the political system.

And he gave the example of Al-Albani in Jordan. He's not participating in the political system.

And the others, he said, are, that's his term, political purists.

He kind of weds these two together. Political purists. These are those who use the political system but to support the ruler, such as the clergy of Saudi Arabia, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia.

So they're not aloof like Al-Albani. They're not out of the system. They're using the system to buttress the system.

So they're supporting the rulers. So these are political purists. They're purists in the sense that they are overall supportive of the regimes that they're a member of.

So he said there's purists of one side and there's purists of the political side. And then he said the halakhis, or the activists, are also two. And so the first are the activists through social media, through parliaments in Kuwait, others, such as Salman al-Awda and Safar al-Hawali.

And so these are through political activism. And then there are the political jihadists, such as Bin Laden. Frankly, he took the same three and made them into four, if you understand what I'm saying.

He just thought he's doing something new, but he's not. It's really the same thing. With Torwitz, essentially, is redone through Paul.

Wagemaker's Refinements

In an article in 2006, Yoas Wagemaker expands upon this typology of Wiktorowicz. And the title of the article is Revisiting Wiktorowicz. And it's probably one of the better articles, even though, obviously, me being who I am, I don't agree with pretty much anything written about Salafis.

But that's a separate point altogether. But nonetheless, it was definitely much better than anything previous to this. And his basic premise was that he's going to agree on the general definitions of Wiktorowicz.

But he argues that these categories are way too broad. And he then goes into detail about how each one should further be subdivided into many. And I'm not going to go into all of that.

I'm just going to make you one example, give you one example so that you understand.

Wagemaker, firstly, doesn't like the term purists because he says they're not purists. They're quietists.

In fact, all Salafis view themselves as being purists. That's what Salafi means, to go back to the pure understanding. So the term, he said, is not correct to be used here.

Also, he says that quietists cannot be put into one category because there are many different types of quietists. And he, in his article, actually subdivides quietists. A quietist is Wiktorowicz purist, right? So that's his understanding.

He divides quietists into three categories.

Number one, he calls them the aloofists. Okay, all of these are interesting terminologies coming from this article, right? So the first are aloofists who avoid politics altogether.

They just don't get involved. They don't talk about politics at all.

Number two are loyalists, those who support the Muslim rulers passively.

And the classic example is the Muftis of Saudi Arabia and the senior clergy of Saudi Arabia.

And then number three are propagandists, those who are actively supporting the Muslim rulers.

Most prominent is, of course, the Rabi al-Madkhali or the Madkhali strand of Salafi Islam, if you are aware of that.

So he divides the quietists into three and similarly the politicos into a number and jihadists into a number. And his article is definitely a refined version of Wiktorowicz and definitely much better.

Problems with Existing Categorizations

Nonetheless, he as well misses a very critical point, which is, of course, quite problematic.

And yet it is something that I think is very important to mention. And that is that within this quietist trend, there is a very, very much more nuanced spectrum that we need to be clear about, especially when it comes to the post-Arab Spring. If one lumps all quietists based upon how they're acting, I think that misses the point.

One needs to go back and understand theologically why are they quietists, which nobody has actually done, neither Wagemaker nor Wiktorowicz, they've never done that. They've never gone and understood why are these particular people quietists from a theological perspective. And that is why, in my humble opinion, all of these are very, very flawed categorizations of Salafis.

And that is because, just to give you again a simple example, that quietists themselves are a very, very interesting spectrum. And I'll give you only three examples amongst them.

Three Types of Quietists

Some quietists interpret the text to indicate that supporting the ruler is an act of faith and a fundamental pillar of the religion.

So if you do not support the ruler, you are a heretic. And of course, the primary example of this is the Madkhalis. They make it a theological point of faith that you must support the ruler.

Out of all of the quietists, whatever my personal position might be about them, they are the most consistent. They will support the ruler regardless. Any ruler, as long as there is no Kufr Bawah.

And we haven't seen them pronounce Kufr Bawah on any ruler, including Mubarak and Sisi. So essentially, it translates as any ruler. Kufr Bawah is blatant apostasy, as one phrase of the Hadith says.

But there's a second strand of quietists. And these, I call them theological pragmatists. And these people, what they argue is that the current rule, and this is especially the case back in the 90s when I was a student there.

And I know this because many of them were my teachers. Almost all the people that we're going to be talking about, I've met personally, except that guy on the far right. I have never met him.

Disclaimer. Never shook hands with him. Make sure.

Everybody needs to know that. But pretty much everybody else I have met and know personally from my studies and whatnot. So what was I saying? So they're theological pragmatists.

And what they argue is that we're not saying that the ruler is an angel, that the ruler has to be supported. But at least the ruler is allowing us to preach Salafi doctrine. To teach the people the right way of Islam.

And because he's allowing us to do that, we'll turn a blind eye to many of the other issues.

Because what's important for us, this is what the senior clergy would argue. It's not as if they love the ruler like the Madkhalis do.

It's not as if they want to support the ruler. They're seeing him as, well you know what, he might have a lot of bad things. But the perk that he's giving us in allowing us to preach our version of Islam is worth the negatives.

Now this is important because if the tide is going to shift, such as right now with MBS. Because this is back in the 90s when Fahad was in charge. King Fahad was in charge.

If the tide is going to shift, these theological pragmatists might shift as well. And we're seeing this post- Arab Spring. You have to go back and understand why are they quietists?

There is yet another strand of quietism.

And these, I call them political pragmatists, not theological. What they argue is that the political engagement of the ruler potentially might lead to a worse situation. They point to Iraq, they point to Syria.

So, status quo is bad. We don't like it. We wish we could change it.

We'd love to change it. It's allowed to change. But only if we feel confident enough that the change is going to be tangible.

We don't want another Iraq, another Syria. These aren't theological pragmatists. These are political pragmatists.

And a lot of the politicals are actually political pragmatists. They're a type of quietists. I don't agree with the categorization here, but that's besides the point as well.

The Problem of Outsider Analysis

Also, there is yet another major problem with all of these categorizations, aptly illustrated in your diagram over here. What the heck is a duck doing in a Salafi presentation at Georgetown?

I wanted to make a challenge. I'm going to quote a duck and put a duck in my picture here.

In all honesty, what is this picture doing? If I were to ask how many of you in this room, 50, if I were to ask all of you what's the first thing that strikes you, I wouldn't get a common answer.

Every one of you would find something bizarre or interesting. And what you found interesting would be more indicative of you than of the picture.

Basically, what I'm trying to say, when Western academics look at Salafism, they're coming with their own orientalizations, and they're trying to fit their models onto the Salafi strands. Not looking at how Salafis themselves view their tradition. What they find bizarre, what they find quantifiable, what they find worthy of demarcation, might not be how Salafis themselves view their own trends.

And I think that's one of the biggest problems of all of these outsider academics, is that they don't quite understand from within what is important. Hence, for example, to this day, it's so frustrating, like 95% of the articles in the books that are written about Salafism, the adjectives that are used and the examples given are not unique to Salafi Islam whatsoever. And yet, that's what I can do.

Oh, Salafis are a very ultra-conservative brand of Islam, who think that Valentine's Day is haram. Let me share with you something. It's not only the Salafis that think Valentine's Day is haram.

Salafis think music and dancing should not be done. There are Shiites in Karbala that don't dance with music as well. That's not what is definitive about Salafi Islam.

And that's the problem when you're an outsider. What you find bizarre, what you find weird, might not necessarily be what they themselves are interested in. And that's, I think, one of the biggest problems of any categorization scheme that is done by those who have vested interests.

And of course, as Foucault says, we all have our vested interests as we approach knowledge.

We all have our preconceived notions of what we want to do. And the reason why, let's be honest here, why is Salafism so hot and sexy these days? It's because it's linked to Jihadism.

It's because that's what people are interested in. And that's why people are studying Salafi. So it's understood, understandable, that they're trying to categorize Salafis based upon politics and based upon dealings with the rulers.

But the fact of the matter is, that's not how most Salafis themselves, what they're concerned about primarily. And that's not how they would view themselves. So I will propose an alternative categorization at the end, one that does not involve a duck, don't worry.

But that's going to be at the end of the lecture.

Case Study: Egyptian Salafism Post-Arab Spring

So now, let us jump into our little bit of our actual talk, and that is Post-Arab Spring. And I wanted to take Egypt as one simple case study.

Egyptian Salafism, of course, is a well-studied phenomenon. It began officially back in 1926 with the Ansar al-Sunnah al-Muhammadiyya. But it always remained a very, very small academic strand, limited to elite intellectual clerics and circles.

However, Salafism in Egypt changed radically from the late 70s, and especially in the 80s, and it became a tidal wave in the 90s. Why? What changed? Two major factors, more than two, but for our purposes, two.

Number one, the rise of a new breed of clerics, most of whom had trained in Saudi Arabia, such as Mohammed Hassan, such as Mohammed Ismail al-Muqaddam, some in Jordan, such as Abu Ishaq al- Huwaini.

And number two, I think more important than number one, the fact that the Egyptian security apparatus made an unofficial wedding with the Salafis back in the 80s and 90s. They made an alliance, and that alliance was, will allow you the platform of the media, of satellite channels, will allow your preachers to preach, go ahead, we're not really going to bother you too much, they didn't give a full green light, but by and large, Salafis were given a free pass to do everything they wanted, by and large, there are some exceptions to this. And most importantly, massive satellite channels in the 90s opened up, and Salafi preachers would be preaching to not only Egypt, but the entire world.

Most prominent amongst them is Qanat al-Nas, on the right hand side, Mohammed Hussein Ya'qub, and of course, Mohammed Hassan, the two of them were the main figures of the Qanat al-Nas, which was one of the most well-watched channels of the time. Now, it seems that, you know, for the time frame, there was a lot of disenfranchisement with the Azhar institutional clerics, there's a vacuum of other preachers, and so some of these clerics became international superstars. The 90s also witnessed the rise of what I call Islamic televangelism, such as Mohammed Hassan is definitely one of the first Muslim televangelists in the world, and Qanat al-Nas is one of the main mediums where that has happened.

Government Alliance with Salafis

And the security apparatus, why would they do this? Why would Egyptian security, why would the Mukhabarat, why would the government want or tacitly allow the Salafis to have free reign?

I think it's obvious, and that is that they felt that quietest, pacifist Salafism, which was and remains the mainstream Salafism, would be an innocuous, innocent method to allow religious people to express their religious tendencies without getting involved in the politics. So they felt that if we allow the Salafis free reign, we're going to get these religious Muslim Brotherhood folks to become more Salafi, and they'll become quietest, apolitical, because that was Qanat al-Nas, that was Mohammed Hassan, these guys were basically apolitical. They were the Albani type of Salafis, not even criticizing Mubarak, having nothing to do with politics.

It's just about doctrines and rituals and prayer and how to pray and where to place the hands and how loud to say Ameen and where to put the pants. All of this stuff the government didn't care about. So the government gave them free pass, and these people became more and more popular.

And it seems to have worked for that time frame. That is because Salafis, generally speaking, throughout the 90s in Egypt, were really apolitical and quietest.

The Transformation During Arab Spring

However, with the start of the protests in the street, the start of the Arab Spring, that's when things began to change.

Now interestingly enough, at the very beginning of the protests, the senior Salafi clerics across Egypt, not a single voice amongst them supported the protesters in the beginning. That was the training they had done:

You have to obey the ruler.

That was the training, that was the theology. You don't oppose the ruler. And some of the most senior clerics, such as Ismail Muqaddam and others, they gave fatwas to their followers, do not go out in the streets, do not protest against the government.

They followed the fatwas from the Saudi scholars, who said that this is:

This is rebel rabble, this is the mob mentality. They called street protesters mob mentality. So they gave fatwas to their followers, don't do that.

However, and this is where it all begins to change, as the tidal wave of public support changed, as people began to rally, and the enthusiasm became really toxic, or just throughout the entire country, we saw for the first time these pacifists, quietists, apolitical salafis, start rethinking through their quietism. And slowly but surely, the main televangelist, Muhammad Hassan, who initially was kind of grudging towards the protesters, he made a point to appear in the streets, he gave a very strategic interview with the protesters, not quite 100% pulling his weight in, pushing his weight in, but at the same time not pushing his weight out. He wanted to have a foot in boat, just in case something happened.

But the fact that he was on the streets, and he made a point to the interview, on the streets, I'm with the people here, and I'm chanting as they're chanting, he's showing himself with them, even if he's not being one of their leaders, that was kind of the beginning of the tidal wave of change that took place, and then slowly but surely with the displacement of Mubarak, and the open call for elections, essentially almost all salafis, except for the Madkhali branch, they have been always the most consistent, almost all salafis, overnight, and this is what's most amazing, went from purists, apolitical quietists, to Haraki activists. Almost overnight, within the span of less than a week or two, the same scholars, a few weeks ago that have been saying, don't protest, don't go out, all of a sudden they're saying, we need to stand for election. We need to take charge of our country.

If we don't do something, these seculars, these liberals are going to come. So they started giving fatwas. One of the most famous, one amongst them said, I used to say that democracy is haram, now I say participation in democracy is our jihad.

That's our jihad. Jihad here means obviously the struggle. We're going to go and struggle through democracy.

We're going to fight, not through the bullets, but the ballots. He literally made that phrase in Arabic. That's going to be our jihad, going to the polls and making sure that we win.

The Electoral Success of 2011

And of course, we all know what happened. In 2011, in the first round of elections, salafis won an astonishing 25% of the popular vote. I mean, even I, and I know my salafis inside out, it was shocking.

25%? Where did that come from? In just 10 years, that's what happened. In 10 years of preaching and teaching, 25% of the Egyptians, the Muslim Brotherhood has been operating for 80 plus years, and they got 70% of the Islamist vote. 25% is going to the salafi parties.

This seems to have emboldened the salafis even more. If they could win one fourth of the seats, with just the quickest of campaigns, the most rudimentary campaigns, what could happen if they actually took charge of the system? And that is when a number of interesting changes happened.

Most importantly, Yasser Bourhami, this person over here, Yasser Bourhami, same name, but absolutely nothing to do with the methodology or tactics.

They just have the first same name, that's it. Nothing else here with him. Yasser Bourhami was one of the main founders, not the main guy, but he is now the main guy, of the Hizb al-Nur, which was a political party from the Da'wah Salafiyya that used to give fatwas that political parties are haram.

The same group, Da'wah Salafiyya, which was the mainstream salafi group, that used to say political parties are haram, one of their main clerics, after Arab Spring, founded Hizb al-Nur, which becomes the main salafi party that's going to run in the elections. They ran, and of course as we all know, Morsi became the president, and they grudgingly gave their support to Morsi. Long story short, they fell out with each other.

Bourhami and Morsi fell out with each other, and then eventually, Bourhami with his Hizb al-Nur and the salafis became the main opposition, or one of the main oppositions to President Morsi. And they sided with Sisi in the coup, and they then supported Sisi, and they gave fatwas to their followers that Sisi is a better candidate than Morsi, and after the revolution, or after the impeachment of Morsi, and the coming to power of Sisi, Hizb al-Nur publicly allied with Sisi's regime, and to this day, they are cozy with Sisi's regime, and they felt that by allying with the ruler, it will ensure that they will have the necessary freedom, and the perks.

However, what has happened, is that popular self, tragically as well, my personal bias is being revealed here, but Bourhami and others turned a blind eye to the massacre of Rabia as well.

They did not criticize Sisi, and they didn't publicly support Grand Mufti of Gaza, but they basically, well, they had to do what they had to do, it was forced, etc., that type of grudging, they didn't proclaim they're happy, but they definitely did not criticize.

Salafi Fragmentation

Now what happened is that of course, within the Salafi movement, plenty of splinter groups formed. Some amongst them, such as I give an example here, there's actually a dozen or so, but one of the more prominent was Dr. Atiyah Adlan, formed the Islah Party, and the Islah Party basically, and you can even

tell, even though he's coming from a Salafi background, you know, trim beard, suit and tie, already the Muslim Brotherhood look is there.

Typically the Salafis are, you know, the thobe and the beards and the caps, they're more puritanical in their dress code, but Atiyah Adlan is that strand of harakis that is now going towards the Muslim Brotherhood, so much so that essentially he ran on a Muslim Brotherhood platform, even though his theology and his legal school is Salafi.

So a number of things happened post Arab Revolution, that Arab Spring, that demonstrated Salafis splintered into many groups. The only person who actually remained consistent was the small strand of Madkhali Salafism, most famous amongst them is Muhammad Saeed Raslan, who basically, whoever was the ruler at the time, would have to obey the ruler, whether it was Mursi or Sisi or whatnot, that's what theology teaches, and even though he has a very small following, and even though, generally speaking, he's not respected, still, he remained consistent to whatever principles that he had.

Now, what we saw, therefore, is that the Arab Spring came along, and these clear demarcations that everybody thought they're talking about, you know, Wagemaker or Wiktorowicz, it completely convoluted everything, and that demonstrated that these clear, you know, these clear demarcations, these clear pigeonhole boxes, it doesn't make sense, and it's not going to make sense, unless you understand the theological underpinnings of why they feel the way that they did. What is the reason that they felt the way that they did, and what the Arab Spring did, it really acted like a catalyst to demonstrate that Salafis themselves, either they didn't think things through, which is also true, or that this notion of quietism, pacifism, political activism, jihadism, it was just a strategic move, not a theological one, and when the situation changed, they changed, and that's what we saw with the Arab Spring.

Regional Variations Post-Arab Spring

Now, of course, the fact of the matter is we can give a lecture about every single, you know, country in the Arab world, and there is no question that the Arab Spring affected Egypt probably more, probably more than any other country, but the same cannot be said of other lands, and I'm not going to give a lecture about every single country, obviously, but the fact of the matter is that each country reacted differently for the Arab Spring.

Lebanon

For example, Lebanon, for example, there was a very, very minimal impact of the Arab Spring, almost indiscernible. Yes, there was a small influx of jihadi Salafis, but that was because of Syria, not actually local. They didn't really impact the local Salafis that much.

Kuwait

In Kuwait, a very interesting scenario emerges. Kuwaiti Salafism, because of the figure of Abd al-Rahman

Abd al-Khaliq from back in the 80s, Kuwaiti Salafism had always been the most, quote-unquote, political, the most haraki from back in the 80s, especially under the banner of the Jam'iyat al-Turath, the Revival of Islamic Heritage, RIHS Society, and it was one of the main opposition parties of the government. The Arab Spring didn't change the strands of Salafism in Kuwait, but what it did do, it exacerbated the tensions between the pre-existing strands.

These pre-existing strands, the madkharis, the quietists, the harakis, they did not change. There was no shifting of loyalties, by and large. There was no shifting of loyalties.

Kuwaiti Salafism remained as is, but these strands just diverged even more, and the acrimony, the animosity between them was exacerbated by the Arab Spring, and of course, one of the most prominent figures of Kuwaiti haraki Salafism is Dr. Hakim al-Mutairi, who is the founder of the Hizb al-Ummah Party, which is one of the most interesting parties to study. Dr. Hakim al-Mutairi has over a million followers on Twitter, and if you just log on to his Facebook and Twitter, he is a professor of Islamic Studies, of Quran, Hadith, and Tafsir, and he is a political analyst, par excellence in the sense, for his people, whether I agree or disagree, besides the point, always talking about politics, always analyzing what's going on in the world, and his party, Hizb al-Ummah, is attracting more and more attention and more and more followers. But he started his party way before the Arab Spring.

Only thing the Arab Spring did was that it boosted his credibility. It boosted his acceptance. He didn't change his methodology.

Kuwaiti Salafism, by and large, remained as it is, but it's simply the Arab Spring acted as a catalyst to some strands. The same can be said of other countries as well. I don't want to go into Tunisia.

I'm definitely not going to touch Syria over here. Not at all. That's a whole different lecture, not related to this talk about Salafis, because that's a specialty in and of itself.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia, just a brief point before I move on to the final few slides. Saudi Arabia, even though I am the most aware of Saudi Salafis, having lived there for almost two decades of my life, I think that it is too premature to talk about the effects of the Arab Spring, because the Arab Spring was very quickly followed by the coming to power of this new MBS, who is now in charge, and I think that the shock and awe of what MBS is doing, I think that many clerics are genuinely confused as to what to do, and we haven't quite seen the impact of not just the Arab Spring, but more so the impact of MBS on modern Saudi Salafis.

Never before has any ruler of Saudi Arabia, since the time of Abdul Aziz, flouted so many of the laws that were considered to be Islamically sacrosanct with such impunity.

Never before have so many scholars been rounded up, jailed, tortured, or killed for the flimsiest of reasons, and the clergy of Saudi Arabia, frankly, don't even know how to react to it. There's still a bit of a shock. However, from my anecdotal sources and my context that I have, just because I lived there for so many years, I really don't have direct context with any of the big clerics anymore, but just because of my context, I can tell you anecdotally, this isn't academic stuff, that more and more clerics seem to be sympathizing with haraki, activist, political Salafism, even though 20 years ago, mainstream Saudi Salafism was apolitical.

But because of what MBS is doing, and especially because of the crackdown against many of the respected clergy, and not to mention so many of the laws that are changing, there is now much more sympathy with the political strand. Having said that, there is also a much more digging deeper of the quietest apolitical branch.

And most importantly, one of the most senior figures, probably more senior in terms of respect than even the Grand Mufti, is Salih al-Fawzan.

Salih al-Fawzan was considered to be, he's still alive, he's considered to be of the same circle as bin Baz and others, in the same age group as that. Salih al-Fawzan, whose nephew, Abd al-Aziz al-Fawzan, a friend of mine, is in jail, and very different methodology of his father. Abd al-Aziz al-Fawzan is more haraki Salafi.

His uncle is Salih al-Fawzan, the elder cleric. Salih al-Fawzan is not liked by MBS. This is, again, the key.

It's really interesting here. There was a famous video of the king disrespecting al-Fawzan and not shaking his hand. The king, Salman.

That is like an insult to the Saudi clergy. Fawzan was insulted publicly because he publicly said that you shouldn't be having these intermixed parties or whatever is going on. So he gave a fatwa and the king basically did not put him in jail.

He was too powerful for that. But basically, you know, was rude to him and whatnot. Still, Fawzan is a supporter of the king.

Why? Because his theology is not Madkhalism. His theology is not waving the flag of the Al Saud. His point is, look at Syria, look at Iraq, look at Libya.

Do you want that for our country? An evil ruler is better than civil war. That's his line. He's not a flag waver and, you know, just a person who's just supporting the royal family.

His point is, our religion teaches us that some sort of civil society is better than chaos. As the Quran says:

So that's his main line here. And ironically, he becomes a supporter of the Al Saud even as the Al Saud marginalizes him.

Those are the types of, you know, interesting dynamics that takes place.

Shifting Religious Alliances Post-Arab Spring

Final points here. What the Arab Spring has also demonstrated, very interestingly, this is probably the most significant, in my humble opinion, of the post-Arab Spring development, is shifting loyalties between the various scholars.

In the 80s and 90s, it was unheard of for mainstream Salafis and mainstream Sufis to break bread together, allegorically. The theological differences went back to 1,400 years, or 1,200 years. They're not gonna ignore those differences.

Salafis call Sufis grave worshippers. Salafis call Shiites this and that. What we see post-Arab Spring is all of a sudden, people's loyalties are shifting from abstract theology, from abstruse points of law, to on-the- ground politics.

And I'll give you the most obvious example, and the most important example, and that is the International Union of Muslim Scholars:

Founded in 2004 by, obviously, Sheikh Al-Qardawi. And at the time, it was meant to be, basically, a conglomeration of all of the senior scholars of the world. And, of course, Sheikh Qardawi is, of course, the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, and his vision was to encompass all of the main schools of Islamic law.

So he invited Salafis, Sufis, Shiites. He invited Shiites. There were Shiites there as well.

Ibadis, Zaidis, all strands of Islam were represented. Currently, at one point in time, there were over 100,000 members of the international... members, members, so the members are anybody who's a scholar of the region across all the countries of the world. Now, obviously, only 100, 200 are senior members, but it's 100,000 members.

And that was founded in 2004. Post-Arab Spring, the International Union of Muslim Scholars supported the Arab Spring. They were angry at Sisi.

They issued a condemnation of the Rabia massacre. And, not coincidentally, some of the senior clerics who supported these regimes, both Salafi and Sufi, resigned from the International Union of Muslim Scholars and eventually formed an alternative council, and that is the United Emirates Peace Forum, which

is an annual forum that takes place under the patronage of, of course, the rulers of the Emirates, the Emirates Republic.

And currently, the International Union of Muslim Scholars is headed by... What's his name again? Faradabi? No, not Faradabi.

Reysouni. Ahmed Reysouni. But one of the main figures is, of course, Sheikh Ahmed Dadu over here.

Sheikh Ahmed Dadu over here is definitely one of the main figures of the International Party.

And they are very, very political. Yesterday, as I was preparing for this talk, I logged onto their Twitter page, and their banner on their Twitter page is, Free the scholars that have been jailed because of their political views, with the pictures of Sheikh Safar al-Hawali and many other scholars that have been jailed.

So that's their banner on Twitter. Free the scholars that have been jailed for their political views.

They have publicly condemned Saudi Arabia for jailing many senior scholars and for their policies.

They've condemned the Emirates for their issues. They've condemned Egypt for their issues.

Obviously, what has this done? Those scholars that are supportive of the regimes, Salafi and Sufi, have withdrawn from that organization and formed their own.

And Salafi and Sufi scholars have now cooperated together with the Emirates Peace Forum.

Here we have the Minister of Islamic Justice, Al-Isa, over here. And here we have, of course, Bin Bayyah, who is, of course, the figurehead, the spiritual figurehead of this entire enterprise.

Definitely the person that they groomed for that position. Of course, with, again, just a factual statement, in America as well, Sheikh Hamza Yusuf is a very big player in this Emirates Peace Forum. And he released a statement last year which caused a lot of controversy where he described the Emirates as being a paragon of tolerance and virtue.

Bin Bayyah has already praised the Sultan as being the embodiment of the virtues of Islam, etc., etc. And understandably, the International Union of Muslim Scholars has been declared a terrorist organization by Egyptian scholars, by the fatwas of al-Azhar, and, by and large, these groups are obviously completely disparate together.

What is interesting, like I said, is this union now between Salafis and Sufis.

Dadu is a Salafi. And Qardawi is a Muslim Brotherhood, you know, not quite the Salafi type.

Here as well we have a Salafi and a Sufi.

We're now getting alliances that have nothing to do with classical theology and have everything to do with politics, with who supports whom. And these alliances are the way things are heading in the post- Arab Spring.

Proposed Alternative Categorization

And I want to conclude here by somewhat convoluted, I'll very quickly go over this and I'm done.

How then should we categorize Salafi groups? This is my categorization based upon having been a part of the movement for quite a lot of months, studied there and what not, knowing the movement inside out, and obviously of this public knowledge I have left the movement and moved on, but still I am very familiar with the movement as having been a part of it for so long, and I understand the inner dynamics of the movement. And I propose a multivariable open-ended typology. It's not simple, it's not easy because Salafis, as we've already seen, they occupy many different ideas and many different understandings.

What I propose is the following, very simply, and I'm going to elaborate on this in the book that I'm currently writing, and that is that we really do need to be, we can't be simplistic and look at Salafis only from politics, only from rulers, only from... No. Salafis are a very interesting group of people who differ on many key issues. So we need to categorize them multivariable, x-y axis.

First and foremost, what did they themselves consider the most important for their group? And that's where these numbers come in, and for every group we can switch those numbers around. So maybe some groups this is going to be number one, other groups that's going to be number five. So for every group we give the priority to what they consider important, because that varies from group to group.

For example, the Salafis of India, the Ahl-e-Hadith movement, the Salafis of Pakistan, they're called the Ahl-e-Hadith movement. Honestly, they couldn't care about the political stances toward the rulers. What they're interested in is point number five, juristical tendencies.

The biggest thing for the Ahl-e-Hadith of India and Pakistan, how do you derive your Islamic law, your fiqh? What are your positions? That's how they're going to categorize you. And within the movement you will have quietists, politicals, whatnot, and that's going to be tolerable. It's not going to be a big deal to them.

So for them, that's what matters. For other groups, other things matter. So these are, I've just given the five main ones, and the six mean you can keep on adding.

That's the point. It's multivariable, open-ended. A time is going to come where another issue becomes important, we can add it to the list no problem.

Also, it's a spectrum. You see, there's a color coding I've done on purpose. It's a spectrum.

Five Key Variables

1. The political stance towards the rulers. And we've talked about five or six different scenarios.

We can categorize every strand. What is their political stance towards the rulers? Is it aloofness? Is it quietness? Why do they feel that way?

2. The involvement in the political process. Do they think it's wise to be involved? Do they think it's wise to not be involved? Is it political? Is it theological? That's a very key point.

Do they theologically believe, like Al-Albani used to believe, theologically, that it is corrupting to the soul to be in politics? It makes you a corrupt human being. You shouldn't get involved in politics because the purity of your faith is going to be sacrificed. That's a theological point here.

Or, is it simply because, oh, well, the current dynamics doesn't allow us. Maybe tomorrow it will.

So what is their role in the political process?

3. A very key point that no author of academic Salafism discusses, even though in my mind it is one of the most important issues of Salafism.

Who do Salafis consider to be Ahl al-Bid'ah? Wrong. And who do they consider to be Kafir? By defining the other, you can see who they are. When they define the other, you see what's important to them.

Right? So what does each strand say about when does a strand become Mubtadi'ah strand? When does a strand leave the fold of Salafism? And then, when does it leave the fold of Islam?

This is a very important factor to categorize Salafis as well.

4. Obviously, interpretation, applicability of Jihad, very important point as well. How do they view Jihad? Is it something that is strategically permissible? I mean, theologically permissible, but strategically not? Is it strategically justified? You have a whole spectrum over here.

5. Juristical tendencies, what is, are they Madhhab? Are they anti-Madhhab? You have an entire spectrum over here. There are three main ones. You have the Madhhabis, you have the Ibn Taymiyyah, conservative, but still Madhhabis.

And then you have the Al-Albani al-Zahiri. You have like the three strands over here. And then I added a point over there which is, you can keep on adding other things as well.

The bottom line is that in order to understand any strand of Salafism, you need to view the world the way that they view it. And you need to prioritize what they prioritize. And that can be done by having this type of open-ended, you know, multi-variable typology.

And if this were to be developed, maybe I'll develop, I don't know, we could literally maybe demarcate, you know, A, B, C, D, you know, A, B, C, D. And then literally for every group, say, okay, this group is 1D, this group is 2F, this group, and you literally just list it and it'll be understood by the people who understand your chart here what type of Salafis they are and what are they prioritizing over others. I think that's a much more realistic, academic, and accurate typography that will reflect the type of Salafism. And also, hopefully, it will also aid us in predicting what might happen if there's another revolution, if the situation changes.

It will not necessarily because sometimes Salafis change their mind, obviously, like any human being, but it might help us a little bit in that regard to conclude.

Personal Conclusion

And on a personal note, Salafism definitely did have an appeal to many people, myself included, I will not deny that.

And the reasons for that was because there was this notion of purity, there was this notion of intellectual revitalization, of a connection with the Turath, with the heritage, of an academic study, a very in-depth study of the classical books.

However, for many Salafis, once that intellectual high subsided, and the many problems that people faced in their daily lives, and the realization that reading ancient textbooks will not necessarily solve those problems, especially the type of problems that caused the Arab Springs of economic issues, of difficulties in paying rent, of the GDPs, of simply living your life in society, the appeal that classical strands of Salafism had rapidly declined, and many people found themselves reorganizing and reorienting their thoughts, and hence, their Salafism continued to change and shift and evolve into different understandings, which is what we are currently seeing.

And with that, I come to my conclusion and open the floor for a Q&A. Thank you.