Islam and Peace A Fundamentalist Perspective (Sherman Jackson)
By Abdal Hakim Jackson | 2026-01-13T19:05:40.334183+00:00 | Topic: Purification
Islam and Peace: A Fundamentalist Perspective
Complete Academic Lecture by Professor Sherman Jackson King Faisal Chair in Islamic Thought and Culture, University of Southern California
Conference Introduction and Opening Remarks
Well, welcome, everybody, to our last session of today. And just a reminder that we are having an event tomorrow at 11 at the Arab American Museum in Dearborn, where the authors will give some further reflections on their subjects, and in some cases, give an entirely different presentation. If you have friends in Dearborn, please tell them how great it would be if they came at 11 to the Arab American Museum.
And this afternoon, we're going to be addressed by Sherman Jackson, the King Faisal Chair in Islamic Thought and Culture and Professor of Religion in American Studies and Ethnicity at the University of Southern California, who received his PhD in Oriental Studies at the University of Pennsylvania, and who is, of course, a longtime colleague here at the University of Michigan before he went to USC, an old friend. And we're so grateful to him for making time in his very busy schedule directing a center there and so forth to come out and address us on this subject.
And he is going to talk about the Gamal-e-Islamiyya, the Islamic grouping which emerged as a fundamentalist organization in the Sadat period and which went on to be implicated in terrorism in the 1990s, the leaders of which while they were cooling their heels in Torah prison gave some deep thought to how they had gotten where they were and what had gone wrong.
And I'll let him tell us the rest of the story. Thank you. Should I? Yeah, go to the podium.
Professor Jackson's Opening
Well, first of all, I can't see you guys because I need those glasses to see, but I can't read without these. So it's really good to be back. 60 degrees is nothing between friends.
But really, it's really good to be back and to see so many familiar faces, to sort of take in the familiar atmosphere. I appreciate this opportunity, Juan, to be called back to enjoy and partake of the intellectual capital in the room. I am an avowed technophobe, so I don't have any of that bid'ah to go up on the screen, et cetera.
And I'm a bit worried about the time, so I'm just going to go into my paper and read it like a traditional, old-fashioned, straight-laced academic.
A Cautionary Note on Peace and Violence
I would like to begin my remarks this afternoon with a cautionary note of sorts. Today, whenever the concept of peace is invoked, it is usually against the perceived threat of physical martial violence.
Peace, in other words, is routinely thought of as the absence or cessation of violence. This is especially the case when religion is brought into the discussion, and all the more so if the religion happens to be Islam. For those of us who are members of the academy, meanwhile, there is an additional challenge.
Violence is the instrument of coercion par excellence. Coercion is the absolute enemy of philosophical liberalism. And philosophical liberalism dominates the Western academy, as it does the political and intellectual culture of America at large.
Cumulatively, all of this results in an unspoken criterion that holds religion to be acceptable only to the extent that it can be domesticated and rendered incapable of challenging the state or the dominant culture, especially through the threat of violence. Those who are contemptuous or dismissive of religion are prone to invoking this criterion as an argument against religion, especially religions that appear to give any quarter to violence. Those who are sympathetic, meanwhile, often so eager to avoid any indictment or criticism of religion that they are incapable of critically engaging it in all its messiness as a lived reality.
Both groups, however, run the risk of self-deception, as both are subject to seeing their respective contributions to the cause of peace as being much greater than they actually are.
Reinhold Niebuhr's Analysis
The celebrated Christian theologian Reinhold Niebuhr reminds us of just how treacherous the terrain of committing oneself to peace can actually be. In his book, Moral Man and Immoral Society, Niebuhr writes, and I quote:
"So persistent is the cry of peace among the ruling classes and so strong the seeming abhorrence of every form of violence and anarchy that one might imagine them actuated by the purest pacifist principles, were it not for the fact that they betray no pacifist scruples when they consider international relations."
Of course, in these odd times of Eric Garner, Ferguson, Missouri, and the like, we need not restrict our gaze to the international arena.
But Niebuhr would go on to observe an even more subtle liability lurking beneath the surface of many calls to peace. The tendency to equate peace with the simple absence of violence, he notes, often masks a false consciousness that fails to recognize just how devastating nonviolent injury can be to human life. The nonviolent abuse of economic, political, intellectual, or cultural power, or even the power differential between a parent and a child can be just as humanly damaging as bullets and bombs of physically destructive.
In such a light, to target only those forms of injury towards which the West feels vulnerable, namely violence in the form of terrorism, while ignoring those forms of injury, including violence to which others feel vulnerable, can hardly amount to a genuine or meaningful commitment to peace. Of course, wanton violence is a major impediment to peace. And given its magnitude and persistence in certain parts of the world, especially the Muslim world, it may be fitting for us scholars and students of Islam to prioritize violence as a problem.
Still, I think, we should be careful about surrendering to the false or self-serving criteria that render us party to an effective conspiracy to promote a kind of peace that serves the interests of some, while blithely ignoring the legitimate right of others to a dignified existence. The fundamentalist perspective on Islam and peace on which I shall focus this afternoon is part of a contemporary Islamist group's self-critique of violence as the primary medium of exchange in negotiating political conflict over the public status and role of Islam. The singular focus on violence, however, should not be taken to imply that this group equates peace with the simple absence of violence, as if to say that once violence ceases to exist, everything will be fine.
As we shall see, they are neither pacifists nor dead to the fact that society can be quite unhealthy, even without violence. For them, however, the problem goes beyond the simple fact or occurrence of violence to the actual status of violence as an Islamic ideal. Their argument, in other words, is essentially against the tendency of Islamist movements to see violence as a duty that Islam imposes upon Muslims as a religious ideal.
On such an understanding, of course, Islam could hardly be reconciled with the value of peaceful coexistence. This is part of the fallacy that these fundamentalist critics would like to challenge.
Defining Fundamentalism
Of course, fundamentalist is an ambiguous and much abused term.
Let me state clearly that my use of the term fundamentalism does not imply any commitment to a literal approach to Muslim scripture or the intellectual tradition of Islam. Fundamentalism, in a Muslim context, refers rather to a particular mode of insisting on the public recognition of the authority of Islam, especially Sharia, or Islamic law, as the organizing principle of Muslim society. While many Muslims who are not fundamentalists also share this commitment, what sets fundamentalists apart is their recognition of violence as a primary medium of exchange between them and those perceived to stand in the way of this goal.
This valuation of violence, however, is grounded not so much in any literal reading of Muslim scripture as it is in a very particular valuation and deployment of Muslim history. As this history was one in which violence was recognized as both a given and an effective negotiating tool, the net result of taking it as the lens through which to read Muslim scripture and tradition is to convert violence into a transcendent value that appears to draw its legitimacy not from history or historical experience, but from scripture itself. In other words, on this reading, violence becomes the Islamic language of social political negotiation, scripturally mandated, permanently normative, and universally applicable in all places in all times.
In this context, the persuasiveness and allure of Muslim fundamentalism resides not so much in any literal authority it accords Muslim scripture, but in the uncritically inflated authority it accords a certain reading of pre-modern Muslim history, a reading that is effectively rendered invisible as a reading by the fact that it resonates so powerfully with a modern Muslim predicament, where like their pre-modern forebearers, Muslims see Islam as being under mortal attack. In other words, this reading produces an interpretive prism that is essentially composed of history, idealized, internalized, and then essentially forgotten as history. As peaceful coexistence was a part of the unimaginable in the pre-modern Muslim past, this perspective renders peaceful coexistence largely unimaginable for Muslim fundamentalists in the present.
This affiliation, however, is precisely what our group shall call into question.
Historical Context: Sadat's Assassination
On October 6th, 1981, the entire world was shocked by the brash spectacle of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's assassination. This was part of a plan to take over the country and establish an Islamic state, the legal, social, economic, and political order of which would be explicitly defined and regulated by Sharia.
This attempted coup had been orchestrated by an amalgamation of militant Islamist groups that came together the previous year under the banner of Egyptian Jihad Incorporated, Tandheem al-Jihad al-Masri, or more simply, Jihad, Inc., Tandheem al-Jihad. Jihad, Inc. was headed by Muhammad Abdus Salam Faraj, and it included two other formal groups, one led by Kamal al-Saeed Habib, the other a contingent largely from Upper Egypt headed by Karam Zuhdi under the name Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya.
It is among the latter and some of its members that I shall focus primarily for the remainder of this presentation. Sadat's assassination was paralleled by an attempt by the Gama'a to take over the city of Asyut and from there march on to Cairo. The Cairo faction of Jihad, Inc. succeeded in assassinating Sadat, as a result of which Faraj, Khaled al-Islambouli, and three others were executed. But the Gama'a's mission failed, as a result of which all of its leaders and scores of its members landed in prison. In prison, internal differences led to the dissolution of Jihad, Inc., and the Gama'a al-Islamiyya resumed its status as an independent organization.
The Violent Period (1991-1995)
This was also the beginning, however, of a new, more violent relationship with the Egyptian state and society. Between 1991 and 1995 alone, they killed an estimated 1,883 people, including Egyptian officials, Coptic Christians, Western tourists, secular intellectuals, security forces, and innocent bystanders. This was met, of course, by brutal government retaliations, including summary executions, mass incarceration, and torture.
At one point, the number of incarcerated Gama'a members alone was placed between 15 and 30,000, making the Gama'a easily the largest radical jihadist movement in Egypt and the Arab world at the time. As both the Egyptian government and the Gama'a saw themselves engaged in an epic battle for their very existence, by the mid-'90s, there was no end in sight to the vicious violence that raged between them.
The Initiative to Stop Violence (1997)
On July 5th, 1997, however, the Gama'a stunned the nation.
At his trial on charges of trying to blow up a bank, one of its members stood up in open court and read a statement signed by six first-tier Gama'a members, or leaders. Quote:
"The historical leadership of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya calls upon their brethren, from among the leadership and the rank and file, to terminate, without stipulation and with no prerequisites, all armed campaigns and communiques that call for such, both inside and outside of Egypt, in the interest of Islam and the Muslims."
End of quote. This was the beginning of the Gama'a's so-called initiative to stop the violence.
The "Correcting Misunderstandings" Manifestos (2002)
A few years later, in 2002, they issued four manifestos under the series title, Correcting Misunderstandings, Silsilat Tazhih al-Mafahim. The explicit aim of these tracts was to repudiate the Gama'a's old commitment to violence as their primary medium of exchange, and to set the group upon a new ideological foundation. Importantly, the Gama'a insisted that their new perspective was explicitly grounded in their new understanding of Sharia, which their years of incarceration had allowed them to study and actually learn, as opposed to simply imagining Sharia's provisions as they had done in the past.
Fiqh al-Waqia: The Jurisprudence of Factual Reality
According to them, their study of Sharia brought them to appreciate the importance of properly assessing the situation on the ground, as a prerequisite to a proper application of the religious law, what they came to refer to as fiqh al-waqia, the jurisprudence of factual reality. On this basis, they insisted that their approach to applying Sharia must recline upon two fundamental constituents. One, actual reality on the ground and its implications, and two, Sharia proofs from the Quran, Sunnah, or other recognized sources of the religious law.
Only through a proper assessment of reality on the ground, in other words, could they determine whether a particular application of the law would actually serve its underlying goals and objectives, the so-called maqasid al-sharia. In the past, they admit, they paid absolutely no attention to any of this, but simply waged jihad based on what they took to be the plain dictates of scripture. Now, by contrast, they understand that a factual assessment of reality might be even more probative than the plain dictates of scripture in determining whether or not a rule should be applied.
This new insight was at the heart of the misunderstanding that they now wanted to correct. What are these broader aims and objectives to which the Gamal repeatedly refers? Chief among them, they
The Gamal al-Islamiya
The Gamal al-Islamiya, or Islamic Group, was founded in Egypt in the 1970s. It is one of the largest and most influential Islamist movements in the country. The group's main goal is to establish an Islamic state in Egypt based on sharia law. The Gamal al-Islamiya has a long history of violence and terrorism, including attacks on government officials, tourists, and other civilians. In the 1990s, the group was responsible for a series of bombings and assassinations that killed hundreds of people. In recent years, the Gamal al-Islamiya has renounced violence and has sought to participate in the political process through peaceful means. The group has also been involved in social and charitable work, providing assistance to the poor and needy.
The Gamal al-Islamiya is a complex and multifaceted organization with a long and complicated history. The group's ideology and goals have evolved over time, and its relationship with the Egyptian government and other Islamist movements has been constantly changing. Despite its renunciation of violence, the Gamal al-Islamiya remains a controversial organization, and its future role in Egyptian politics is uncertain.
The Gamal al-Islamiya is a Sunni Islamist movement that seeks to establish an Islamic state in Egypt based on sharia law. The group was founded in the 1970s by a group of students and clerics who were inspired by the teachings of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Gamal al-Islamiya quickly became one of the most influential Islamist movements in Egypt, attracting a large following among students, workers, and the urban poor.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Gamal al-Islamiya engaged in a series of violent attacks against the Egyptian government, including bombings, assassinations, and armed clashes. The group's goal was to overthrow the government and establish an Islamic state. However, the government responded with a brutal crackdown, and many of the group's leaders and members were arrested or killed.
In the late 1990s, the Gamal al-Islamiya began to reconsider its strategy of violence. Some of the group's leaders, including Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, who was imprisoned in the United States for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, began to argue that violence was counterproductive and that the group should instead focus on peaceful means of achieving its goals.
In 2003, the Gamal al-Islamiya officially renounced violence and declared a ceasefire with the Egyptian government. The group also began to participate in the political process through peaceful means, such as forming political parties and running candidates in elections.
Today, the Gamal al-Islamiya is a legal political party in Egypt. The group has a significant following among the Egyptian people, and it is one of the most influential Islamist movements in the country. The Gamal al-Islamiya's main goals are to promote Islamic values and principles in Egyptian society, to advocate for social justice and economic equality, and to work towards the establishment of an Islamic state in Egypt.
The Gamal al-Islamiya is a complex and multifaceted organization with a long and complicated history. The group's ideology and goals have evolved over time, and its relationship with the Egyptian government and other Islamist movements has been constantly changing. Despite its renunciation of violence, the Gamal al-Islamiya remains a controversial organization, and its future role in Egyptian politics is uncertain.
The Gamal al-Islamiya is a Sunni Islamist movement that seeks to establish an Islamic state in Egypt based on sharia law. The group was founded in the 1970s by a group of students and clerics who were inspired by the teachings of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Gamal al-Islamiya quickly became one of the most influential Islamist movements in Egypt, attracting a large following among students, workers, and the urban poor.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Gamal al-Islamiya engaged in a series of violent attacks against the Egyptian government, including bombings, assassinations, and armed clashes. The group's goal was to overthrow the government and establish an Islamic state. However, the government responded with a brutal crackdown, and many of the group's leaders and members were arrested or killed.
In the late 1990s, the Gamal al-Islamiya began to reconsider its strategy of violence. Some of the group's leaders, including Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, who was imprisoned in the United States for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, began to argue that violence was counterproductive and that the group should instead focus on peaceful means of achieving its goals.
In 2003, the Gamal al-Islamiya officially renounced violence and declared a ceasefire with the Egyptian government. The group also began to participate in the political process through peaceful means, such as forming political parties and running candidates in elections.
Today, the Gamal al-Islamiya is a legal political party in Egypt. The group has a significant following among the Egyptian people, and it is one of the most influential Islamist movements in the country. The Gamal al-Islamiya's main goals are to promote Islamic values and principles in Egyptian society, to advocate for social justice and economic equality, and to work towards the establishment of an Islamic state in Egypt.
The Gamal al-Islamiya is a complex and multifaceted organization with a long and complicated history. The group's ideology and goals have evolved over time, and its relationship with the Egyptian government and other Islamist movements has been constantly changing. Despite its renunciation of violence, the Gamal al-Islamiya remains a controversial organization, and its future role in Egyptian politics is uncertain.
The Gamal al-Islamiya is a Sunni Islamist movement that seeks to establish an Islamic state in Egypt based on sharia law. The group was founded in the 1970s by a group of students and clerics who were inspired by the teachings of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Gamal al-Islamiya quickly became one of the most influential Islamist movements in Egypt, attracting a large following among students, workers, and the urban poor.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Gamal al-Islamiya engaged in a series of violent attacks against the Egyptian government, including bombings, assassinations, and armed clashes. The group's goal was to overthrow the government and establish an Islamic state. However, the government responded with a brutal crackdown, and many of the group's leaders and members were arrested or killed.
In the late 1990s, the Gamal al-Islamiya began to reconsider its strategy of violence. Some of the group's leaders, including Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, who was imprisoned in the United States for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, began to argue that violence was counterproductive and that the group should instead focus on peaceful means of achieving its goals.
In 2003, the Gamal al-Islamiya officially renounced violence and declared a ceasefire with the Egyptian government. The group also began to participate in the political process through peaceful means, such as forming political parties and running candidates in elections.
Today, the Gamal al-Islamiya is a legal political party in Egypt. The group has a significant following among the Egyptian people, and it is one of the most influential Islamist movements in the country. The Gamal al-Islamiya's main goals are to promote Islamic values and principles in Egyptian society, to advocate for social justice and economic equality, and to work towards the establishment of an Islamic state in Egypt.
The Gamal al-Islamiya is a complex and multifaceted organization with a long and complicated history. The group's ideology and goals have evolved over time, and its relationship with the Egyptian government and other Islamist movements has been constantly changing. Despite its renunciation of violence, the Gamal al-Islamiya remains a controversial organization, and its future role in Egyptian politics is uncertain.
The Gamal al-Islamiya is a Sunni Islamist movement that seeks to establish an Islamic state in Egypt based on sharia law. The group was founded in the 1970s by a group of students and clerics who were inspired by the teachings of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Gamal al-Islamiya quickly became one of the most influential Islamist movements in Egypt, attracting a large following among students, workers, and the urban poor.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Gamal al-Islamiya engaged in a series of violent attacks against the Egyptian government, including bombings, assassinations, and armed clashes. The group's goal was to overthrow the government and establish an Islamic state. However, the government responded with a brutal crackdown, and many of the group's leaders and members were arrested or killed.
In the late 1990s, the Gamal al-Islamiya began to reconsider its strategy of violence. Some of the group's leaders, including Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, who was imprisoned in the United States for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, began to argue that violence was counterproductive and that the group should instead focus on peaceful means of achieving its goals.
In 2003, the Gamal al-Islamiya officially renounced violence and declared a ceasefire with the Egyptian government. The group also began to participate in the political process through peaceful means, such as forming political parties and running candidates in elections.
Today, the Gamal al-Islamiya is a legal political party in Egypt. The group has a significant following among the Egyptian people, and it is one of the most influential Islamist movements in the country. The Gamal al-Islamiya's main goals are to promote Islamic values and principles in Egyptian society, to advocate for social justice and economic equality, and to work towards the establishment of an Islamic state in Egypt.
The Gamal al-Islamiya is a complex and multifaceted organization with a long and complicated history. The group's ideology and goals have evolved over time, and its relationship with the Egyptian government and other Islamist movements has been constantly changing. Despite its renunciation of violence, the Gamal al-Islamiya remains a controversial organization, and its future role in Egyptian politics is uncertain.
The Gamal al-Islamiya is a Sunni Islamist movement that seeks to establish an Islamic state in Egypt based on sharia law. The group was founded in the 1970s by a group of students and clerics who were inspired by the teachings of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Gamal al-Islamiya quickly became one of the most influential Islamist movements in Egypt, attracting a large following among students, workers, and the urban poor.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Gamal al-Islamiya engaged in a series of violent attacks against the Egyptian government, including bombings, assassinations, and armed clashes. The group's goal was to overthrow the government and establish an Islamic state. However, the government responded with a brutal crackdown, and many of the group's leaders and members were arrested or killed.
In the late 1990s, the Gamal al-Islamiya began to reconsider its strategy of violence. Some of the group's leaders, including Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, who was imprisoned in the United States for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, began to argue that violence was counterproductive and that the group should instead focus on peaceful means of achieving its goals.
In 2003, the Gamal al-Islamiya officially renounced violence and declared a ceasefire with the Egyptian government. The group also began to participate in the political process through peaceful means, such as forming political parties and running candidates in elections.
Today, the Gamal al-Islamiya is a legal political party in Egypt. The group has a significant following among the Egyptian people, and it is one of the most influential Islamist movements in the country. The Gamal al-Islamiya's main goals are to promote Islamic values and principles in Egyptian society, to advocate for social justice and economic equality, and to work towards the establishment of an Islamic state in Egypt.
The Gamal al-Islamiya is a complex and multifaceted organization with a long and complicated history. The group's ideology and goals have evolved over time, and its relationship with the Egyptian government and other Islamist movements has been constantly changing. Despite its renunciation of violence, the Gamal al-Islamiya remains a controversial organization, and its future role in Egyptian politics is uncertain.
The Gamal al-Islamiya is a Sunni Islamist movement that seeks to establish an Islamic state in Egypt based on sharia law. The group was founded in the 1970s by a group of students and clerics who were inspired by the teachings of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Gamal al-Islamiya quickly became one of the most influential Islamist movements in Egypt, attracting a large following among students, workers, and the urban poor.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Gamal al-Islamiya engaged in a series of violent attacks against the Egyptian government, including bombings, assassinations, and armed clashes. The group's goal was to overthrow the government and establish an Islamic state. However, the government responded with a brutal crackdown, and many of the group's leaders and members were arrested or killed.
In the late 1990s, the Gamal al-Islamiya began to reconsider its strategy of violence. Some of the group's leaders, including Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, who was imprisoned in the United States for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, began to argue that violence was counterproductive and that the group should instead focus on peaceful means of achieving its goals.
In 2003, the Gamal al-Islamiya officially renounced violence and declared a ceasefire with the Egyptian government. The group also began to participate in the political process through peaceful means, such as forming political parties and running candidates in elections.
Today, the Gamal al-Islamiya is a legal political party in Egypt. The group has a significant following among the Egyptian people, and it is one of the most influential Islamist movements in the country. The Gamal al-Islamiya's main goals are to promote Islamic values and principles in Egyptian society, to advocate for social justice and economic equality, and to work towards the establishment of an Islamic state in Egypt.
The Gamal al-Islamiya is a complex and multifaceted organization with a long and complicated history. The group's ideology and goals have evolved over time, and its relationship with the Egyptian government and other Islamist movements has been constantly changing. Despite its renunciation of violence, the Gamal al-Islamiya remains a controversial organization, and its future role in Egyptian politics is uncertain.
The Gamal al-Islamiya is a Sunni Islamist movement that seeks to establish an Islamic state in Egypt based on sharia law. The group was founded in the 1970s by a group of students and clerics who were inspired by the teachings of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Gamal al-Islamiya quickly became one of the most influential Islamist movements in Egypt, attracting a large following among students, workers, and the urban poor.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Gamal al-Islamiya engaged in a series of violent attacks against the Egyptian government, including bombings, assassinations, and armed clashes. The group's goal was to overthrow the government and establish an Islamic state. However, the government responded with a brutal crackdown, and many of the group's leaders and members were arrested or killed.
In the late 1990s, the Gamal al-Islamiya began to reconsider its strategy of violence. Some of the group's leaders, including Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, who was imprisoned in the United States for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, began to argue that violence was counterproductive and that the group should instead focus on peaceful means of achieving its goals.
In 2003, the Gamal al-Islamiya officially renounced violence and declared a ceasefire with the Egyptian government. The group also began to participate in the political process through peaceful means, such as forming political parties and running candidates in elections.
Today, the Gamal al-Islamiya is a legal political party in Egypt. The group has a significant following among the Egyptian people, and it is one of the most influential Islamist movements in the country. The Gamal al-Islamiya's main goals are to promote Islamic values and principles in Egyptian society, to advocate for social justice and economic equality, and to work towards the establishment of an Islamic state in Egypt.
The Gamal al-Islamiya is a complex and multifaceted organization with a long and complicated history. The group's ideology and goals have evolved over time, and its relationship with the Egyptian government and other Islamist movements has been constantly changing. Despite its renunciation of violence, the Gamal al-Islamiya remains a controversial organization, and its future role in Egyptian politics is uncertain.
The Gamal al-Islamiya is a Sunni Islamist movement that seeks to establish an Islamic state in Egypt based on sharia law. The group was founded in the 1970s by a group of students and clerics who were inspired by the teachings of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Gamal al-Islamiya quickly became one of the most influential Islamist movements in Egypt, attracting a large following among students, workers, and the urban poor.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Gamal al-Islamiya engaged in a series of violent attacks against the Egyptian government, including bombings, assassinations, and armed clashes. The group's goal was to overthrow the government and establish an Islamic state. However, the government responded with a brutal crackdown, and many of the group's leaders and members were arrested or killed.
In the late 1990s, the Gamal al-Islamiya began to reconsider its strategy of violence. Some of the group's leaders, including Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, who was imprisoned in the United States for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, began to argue that violence was counterproductive and that the group should instead focus on peaceful means of achieving its goals.
In 2003, the Gamal al-Islamiya officially renounced violence and declared a ceasefire with the Egyptian government. The group also began to participate in the political process through peaceful means, such as forming political parties and running candidates in elections.
Today, the Gamal al-Islamiya is a legal political party in Egypt. The group has a significant following among the Egyptian people, and it is one of the most influential Islamist movements in the country. The Gamal al-Islamiya's main goals are to promote Islamic values and principles in Egyptian society, to advocate for social justice and economic equality, and to work towards the establishment of an Islamic state in Egypt.
The Gamal al-Islamiya is a complex and multifaceted organization with a long and complicated history. The group's ideology and goals have evolved over time, and its relationship with the Egyptian government and other Islamist movements has been constantly changing. Despite its renunciation of violence, the Gamal al-Islamiya remains a controversial organization, and its future role in Egyptian politics is uncertain.
The Gamal al-Islamiya is a Sunni Islamist movement that seeks to establish an Islamic state in Egypt based on sharia law. The group was founded in the 1970s by a group of students and clerics who were inspired by the teachings of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Gamal al-Islamiya quickly became one of the most influential Islamist movements in Egypt, attracting a large following among students, workers, and the urban poor.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Gamal al-Islamiya engaged in a series of violent attacks against the Egyptian government, including bombings, assassinations, and armed clashes. The group's goal was to overthrow the government and establish an Islamic state. However, the government responded with a brutal crackdown, and many of the group's leaders and members were arrested or killed.
In the late 1990s, the Gamal al-Islamiya began to reconsider its strategy of violence. Some of the group's leaders, including Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, who was imprisoned in the United States for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, began to argue that violence was counterproductive and that the group should instead focus on peaceful means of achieving its goals.
In 2003, the Gamal al-Islamiya officially renounced violence and declared a ceasefire with the Egyptian government. The group also began to participate in the political process through peaceful means, such as forming political parties and running candidates in elections.
Today, the Gamal al-Islamiya is a legal political party in Egypt. The group has a significant following among the Egyptian people, and it is one of the most influential Islamist movements in the country. The Gamal al-Islamiya's main goals are to promote Islamic values and principles in Egyptian society, to advocate for social justice and economic equality, and to work towards the establishment of an Islamic state in Egypt.
The Gamal al-Islamiya is a complex and multifaceted organization with a long and complicated history. The group's ideology and goals have evolved over time, and its relationship with the Egyptian government and other Islamist movements has been constantly changing. Despite its renunciation of violence, the Gamal al-Islamiya remains a controversial organization, and its future role in Egyptian politics is uncertain.
The Gamal al-Islamiya is a Sunni Islamist movement that seeks to establish an Islamic state in Egypt based on sharia law. The group was founded in the 1970s by a group of students and clerics who were inspired by the teachings of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Gamal al-Islamiya quickly became one of the most influential Islamist movements in Egypt, attracting a large following among students, workers, and the urban poor.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Gamal al-Islamiya engaged in a series of violent attacks against the Egyptian government, including bombings, assassinations, and armed clashes. The group's goal was to overthrow the government and establish an Islamic state. However, the government responded with a brutal crackdown, and many of the group's leaders and members were arrested or killed.
In the late 1990s, the Gamal al-Islamiya began to reconsider its strategy of violence. Some of the group's leaders, including Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, who was imprisoned in the United States for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, began to argue that violence was counterproductive and that the group should instead focus on peaceful means of achieving its goals.
In 2003, the Gamal al-Islamiya officially renounced violence and declared a ceasefire with the Egyptian government. The group also began to participate in the political process through peaceful means, such as forming political parties and running candidates in elections.
Today, the Gamal al-Islamiya is a legal political party in Egypt. The group has a significant following among the Egyptian people, and it is one of the most influential Islamist movements in the country. The Gamal al-Islamiya's main goals are to promote Islamic values and principles in Egyptian society, to advocate for social justice and economic equality, and to work towards the establishment of an Islamic state in Egypt.
The Gamal al-Islamiya is a complex and multifaceted organization with a long and complicated history. The group's ideology and goals have evolved over time, and its relationship with the Egyptian government and other Islamist movements has been constantly changing. Despite its renunciation of violence, the Gamal al-Islamiya remains a controversial organization, and its future role in Egyptian politics is uncertain.
The Gamal al-Islamiya is a Sunni Islamist movement that seeks to establish an Islamic state in Egypt based on sharia law. The group was founded in the 1970s by a group of students and clerics who were inspired by the teachings of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Gamal al-Islamiya quickly became one of the most influential Islamist movements in Egypt, attracting a large following among students, workers, and the urban poor.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Gamal al-Islamiya engaged in a series of violent attacks against the Egyptian government, including bombings, assassinations, and armed clashes. The group's goal was to overthrow the government and establish an Islamic state. However, the government responded with a brutal crackdown, and many of the group's leaders and members were arrested or killed.
In the late 1990s, the Gamal al-Islamiya began to reconsider its strategy of violence. Some of the group's leaders, including Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, who was imprisoned in the United States for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, began to argue that violence was counterproductive and that the group should instead focus on peaceful means of achieving its goals.
In 2003, the Gamal al-Islamiya officially renounced violence and declared a ceasefire with the Egyptian government. The group also began to participate in the political process through peaceful means, such as forming political parties and running candidates in elections.
Today, the Gamal al-Islamiya is a legal political party in Egypt. The group has a significant following among the Egyptian people, and it is one of the most influential Islamist movements in the country. The Gamal al-Islamiya's main goals are to promote Islamic values and principles in Egyptian society, to advocate for social justice and economic equality, and to work towards the establishment of an Islamic state in Egypt.
The Gamal al-Islamiya is a complex and multifaceted organization with a long and complicated history. The group's ideology and goals have evolved over time, and its relationship with the Egyptian government and other Islamist movements has been constantly changing. Despite its renunciation of violence, the Gamal al-Islamiya remains a controversial organization, and its future role in Egyptian politics is uncertain.
The Gamal al-Islamiya is a Sunni Islamist movement that seeks to establish an Islamic state in Egypt based on sharia law. The group was founded in the 1970s by a group of students and clerics who were inspired by the teachings of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Gamal al-Islamiya quickly became one of the most influential Islamist movements in Egypt, attracting a large following among students, workers, and the urban poor.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Gamal al-Islamiya engaged in a series of violent attacks against the Egyptian government, including bombings, assassinations, and armed clashes. The group's goal was to overthrow the government and establish an Islamic state. However, the government responded with a brutal crackdown, and many of the group's leaders and members were arrested or killed.
The Civilizational Critique
It does not take much, however, to see that this perspective is reinforced, if not partly inspired, by what is seen to be the obvious role that violence played in the West's colonial and post-colonial success. In other words, this is simply part of the common tendency of the vanquished to imitate the victor. At any rate, according to Ibrahim and al-Najjar, the single-minded focus on violence comes at the expense of the civilizational dimensions of Islam.
And it is only according to them, as a civilization, a Hadara Islamia, whose groundedness in religion gives it the bearing and confidence to contribute to and benefit from cultural, intellectual, and commercial exchange with other cultures and civilizations, that Islam can compete on the global stage and provide for its own long-term sustainability. This is the way it was, it actually was in the Muslim past, going all the way back to the time of the Prophet himself. But again, the narrative generated by ISIS does not recognize the value of culture or civilization.
And this is why, according to Ibrahim and al-Najjar, the skills and talents displayed by some of its most gifted recruits are almost never deployed beyond the goal of exercising control over its populace or waging war against the West. In this way, ISIS shoots both itself and the ummah in the foot. For, and I quote:
"Even if they are able to seize control over this or that patch of land, nations and civilizations are not just patches of geography or caches of weapons. They are something much broader, much more inclusive, and deeper. Nations are extensions of culture, civilization, history, and inherited values, as well as social and religious heterodyning."
End of quote. This combination, according to Ibrahim and al-Najjar, is what enables nations to sustain themselves, influence others, and thrive in the face of the kinds of challenges that typically face nations.
The Modern State vs Gang Mentality
But ISIS's obliviousness to the value of culture and civilization and its assumption that power and violence can substitute for these, impedes its ability to properly conceptualize, let alone build what Ibrahim and al-Najjar refer to as a modern state, a doha asriyya, not to mention a super state in the form of a caliphate. Here, the author's assessment is counseling a rather sanitized depiction of Europe and America, who are imagined to have completely overcome such challenges as dictatorship, injustice, inequality, lack of freedom, and the treatment of minorities. At the same time, it proceeds on the assumption that the solutions arrived at by the West are exactly those anticipated by the broader aims and objectives of sharia.
By contrast, according to them, ISIS's obliviousness to a proper understanding of sharia condemns them to ignoring the structural imperatives of Islam, such as serving the common will, equality before the law, freedom, administrative accountability, and respect for minorities, sacrificing all of this in favor of an almost exclusive focus on the so-called prescribed punishments, or hudud, as some sort of symbolic representation of a normative Islamic order.
This is based, according to Ibrahim and al-Najjar, on both an abuse and a misunderstanding of political power in Islam, for political power, or sulta, is not the private property of the Muslim ruler or caliph to be used solely to solidify and enhance his position. On the contrary, it is a public trust, an amanah, that is to be used to promote the public interest.
But ISIS has no time for such structural imperatives as constitutional values, al-qiyam al-dasturiya. As a result, their program remains very simple, autocracy in the name of religion, al-istibdad bismiddin. Of course, there is much in pre-modern Muslim history, like the history of the rest of the pre-modern world, that can be called upon to lend support to non-representative government.
And this is why the unhealthy relationship that Muslim fundamentalists have with their history is so problematic. For not only does this reading apotheosize this history, thus retarding Muslim efforts to oppose autocracy in the name of Islam, it weakens Muslims' ability to resist the power and confidence wielded by those who enjoy the fruits of representative government. In effect, it renders the sociopolitical grasp outside of Islam seductively greener than anything that Muslims can boast.
Thus write Ibrahim and Najjar, this is a quote from them:
"Barack Obama, sitting in his office, in the White House, in Washington, with his shiny black shoes and long legs stretched out over his desk, will be able to dismantle this so-called caliphate with the greatest of ease, not with scud missiles and drones, but with the power that the high constitutional principles and values of Sharia confer upon any people, even if they are not Muslims."
End of quote.
Creating a Society of Hypocrites
Again, while ISIS is the direct object of this critique, it is aimed at Islamist movements in general, for almost all of them, in the view of Ibrahim and Najjar, are blinded by their inflated estimation of violence and coercive power to the necessity of ingratiating their constituencies with the values, virtues, and possibilities of their religion, en route to establishing a mutually supportive relationship between Islam and the people, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. This, they warn, will ultimately result in a population of hypocrites who thrive on dishonesty, duplicity, and facile opportunism as survival mechanisms, whose intentions are never pure, but always provisional, and who come to love, hate, fear, and cower to power and anyone associated with it.
Ibn Khaldun on Autocracy
Here, incidentally, in their own move to draw on the authority of pre-modern Muslim history, Ibrahim and Najjar invoke the celebrated father of sociology, Ibn Khaldun. They quote:
"When political power is used in a manner that is overly domineering, abusive, and quick to punish, constantly seeking to expose people's breaches and enumerate their sins, fear and humiliation invariably grip the people, and they in turn seek refuge in lying and deception, and their inner consciences are thoroughly compromised."
In sum, the kind of religious autocracy embraced and promulgated by ISIS and other Islamist groups will unavoidably result not only in dysfunctional states and a stillborn caliphate, but also in a society of scarred and broken people, feeble replicas of Adorno's authoritarian personality.
This will be a mass of bullies who are also easily bullied, men and women who are subservient not only to rightful guides and superiors, rightful guides and superiors, but to anyone who is more powerful than they are, and all of this, alas, perpetuated and legitimized in the name of Islam.
Apocalyptic Reports and Divine Injunctions
There's one final aspect of Ibrahim and Najjar's critique that I would like to mention briefly. As is known, ISIS espoused a certain apocalyptic vision connected with the Syrian town of Dabiq, after which it named its magazine.
Ibrahim and Najjar do not refer to Dabiq directly, but take up the general issue of apocalyptic statements attributed to the prophet, as they see these as another way in which ISIS seeks not only to confer religious legitimacy upon the primacy of violence, but to imbue ordinary Muslims and potential recruits with a sense of being religiously bound to support such commitments to bloodletting. Ibrahim's and then Najjar's response is that leaving aside the question of whether these reports from the prophet are all reliable, there is a difference between what they refer to as a khitab shar'i, or a divine injunction, and a khitab qadari, or a divine report. While a divine injunction requires Muslims to act in a manner that fulfills that injunction, a divine report requires only that Muslims believe in such reports.
Thus, for example, if the prophet reports that the Qaddafi will be dismantled into petty kingdoms, this does not require Muslims to contribute to this dismantling. It merely requires of them that they believe that this will ultimately happen. In terms of their actual actions, divine injunctions may actually require Muslims to act in a manner that forestalls or reverses an inevitable occurrence.
The same logic applies to end of time reports regarding apocalyptic confrontations between Muslims and non-Muslims. It does not dictate that the relationship between the two can only be one of violence. All of this takes us back to a concern expressed by the Gamay as a whole back in 2002 in the beginning of its initiative to stop the violence.
There they expressed deep anxieties about how the acceptance of violence as the most Islamically authentic means for Muslims to deal with social political conflict can become entrenched to the point that it is raised beyond critique. Then they wrote the following:
"We fear that if matters persist as they are and the flames of vengeance continue to smolder in people's hearts, that the matter will get out of hand, the tear in the fabric will expand beyond any mender's ability, and it will no longer fall within the capacity of anyone to return matters to their proper course.
Similarly, we fear that the continuation of these confrontations will generate numerous understandings that become normalized with the passing of time to the point that those who hold such understandings due to their long familiarity with them come to believe that they are factually consistent with Sharia and that there is nothing wrong with them. In fact, subsequent generations will come to receive these notions as if they were the very core and the spirit of religion."
Additional Critiques and Challenges
There are other, in my views, less salient features of Ibrahim's and then Najjar's critique that time will not permit me to cover here.
For example, more could be said about the role of sectarianism in ISIS's approach and the charge that ISIS is a godsend to Western powers who want to keep the Muslim world weak and divided. This actually goes back, this particular critique, to an aspect of the Gamal's own self-critique back in the 1990s and the early 2000s. At that time, they chided themselves over the fact that their fundamentalist activities kept the Egyptian state, the largest Arab Muslim regional power, turned in on its own internal problems, leaving Israel and the United States free to romp about as they pleased.
Beyond this, there are a number of points on which one might want to challenge Ibrahim and then Najjar, such as the sense they give that everything that led to the West's ascendancy was already there in Islam centuries earlier, just waiting to be activated, or the impression that they occasionally give that Muslim scripture totally devalues violence. Then there is the question of how exactly, in concrete terms, to impose principled restrictions on the enterprise of calibrating scriptural interpretations to changes in history. In conclusion, however, again, given the limits of time, there are two final observations that I would like to register.
I only have two pages, can I? Because otherwise I'm gonna speed up. Absolutely. Okay, thank you. Because I get nervous and I start talking real fast. All right. Sure.
Final Observations
First Observation: Sharia-Based Critique
The first is simply a reminder that for all the pragmatism displayed in the analyses of Ibrahim and then Najjar, indeed by the Gamayas as a whole, their critique is fundamentally, this is an important point, based in a reading of Sharia. In this regard, it does not differ in kind, even if it may in degree and detail, from critiques put forth by members of the official religious establishment. Perhaps the biggest difference is that the Gamaya members tend to take a more macro approach, as opposed to the more detail-oriented, casuistic, or micro approach reflected, for example, in the fatwa of Sheikh Mohammed Yacoubi, or the joint letters sent to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi by a group of Muslim scholars and clerics from around the world.
Nevertheless, the Gamaya's critique should give pause to those who tend to look upon Sharia, or what has become known in the West as Sharia law, as invariably contributing to the mentality of ISIS or other extremists, and never fundamentally challenging any of this. Our authors demonstrate, in other words, that not only can principle critiques of ISIS come from liberals, secularists, or so-called progressives, they can also come from the pens of bearded men with fundamentalist ties and strong attachments to Sharia.
Second Observation: The Moral Status of Violence
The second observation relates to the moral status of violence in the critique of Ibrahim and Nadjar. While our authors are explicit in condemning violence on practical grounds, there seems to be little in the way of moral condemnation, that is, violence as a moral evil that stands in the way of peace as a moral good. This is more a matter, however, of my own particular reading of them. At several points and under several headings, they strongly and explicitly condemn ISIS's violence on moral grounds.
In fact, they insist that ISIS's violence not only violates Islam, but the very norms of manhood, ar-rajula, and a normative sense, an enormative Arab sense of self, al-aruba. Indeed, they insist such violence bespeaks, and I quote here, "a rupture of the basic constitution of human mercy that should reside in the heart of any human being, let alone any Muslim, be he or she Sunni or Shiite." End of quote.
Avoiding Western Obsession with Violence
But I have chosen not to place this moral critique front and center in an effort to avoid the risk of distorting the overall thrust of their message by allowing it to be overly informed by our Western obsession, especially in the post-911 Western obsession, with Muslim violence and barbarity.
In the West, we tend to focus on little more than ISIS's violence and intolerance. And in the Muslim community, this is routinely more for the purpose of distancing American Muslims from such behavior than it is out of any recognition of any broader aims and objectives of Islam that might be obliterated thereby. From this vantage point, it becomes easy for us to recognize critiques of ISIS's violence, but more difficult to see anything beyond this.
By contrast, Ibrahim and Najjar seem to be saying that while violence is a problem to be sure, there is much more to be considered beyond the question of violence. In fact, their message seems to be that were ISIS to adopt or acquire a more comprehensive understanding of Sharia, according to which ample attention and priority went to such enterprises as culture, civilization, economics, and the development of political thought, the very value of their brand of violence would be drastically reduced even in their own eyes, as it would be seen as being totally irrelevant to Islam's long-term interests and the restoration of its place in the world. It may be then that by our focusing so
Question and Answer Session
I'd like to take that. Yes, you're welcome to get the. So.
Should I sit down or? I think, why don't you do what you feel comfortable doing. I think we're gonna, our schedule says that I would make some remarks now, but this is such a rich paper and so timely. I think I'd rather cede my time to the audience discussion.
I'm sure you're very eager to interact with Professor Jackson. So do you mind just taking your own questions? Like coming back home. Yes.
I'm sorry to point out. Yeah, wait for the mic. Okay, yeah.
Question One: Parallels with Contemporary Politics
Thank you very much for that, as Juan just said, a very rich paper. I think it's such a nice reminder too that in the Christian world, as in the Muslim world, fundamentalism began with this kind of energetic engaged, loving kind of engagement with texts, which were perceived to have, to be created at a temporal distance from the present, but still to speak to the present, right? In a very meaningful way. And so I love the way your paper began with that kind of engagement.
And I loved the transformation of the gamut indeed by studying these texts while in isolation. Excuse me. But my question for you is this.
When you were describing Ibrahim and Najjar's critique of ISIS, it sounded very much like you were talking about liberal critiques of Trump and Trump's regime. Was that at all intention? I mean, I was seeing kind of a mirror of the world that we're living in today. Was that at all intentional and a deliberate part of your argument? Or would you care to comment on it?
Professor Jackson's Response:
Well, deliberate only in the sense that I'm trying to be sort of true to my understanding of what Ibrahim and Najjar are themselves trying to convey.
I would not have too much of a problem with describing this as a sort of liberal critique with one exception. And I don't wanna get into this. Naeem, we can have this, we can fight about this.
But I think that, and this is one of my critiques, quite frankly, of the Western Academy. I think that liberal values, I mean, such as freedom, all right, freedom of speech and these kinds of things are one thing. Liberal procedures for producing and sustaining them are something else.
And we tend to equate one with the other. So the liberal value of freedom of minorities, for example, all right? I mean, you can do that through Rawlsian liberalism. Or you can do it by simply saying, look, Sharia says Christians can drink wine, end of discussion.
So they have that freedom without the Rawlsian public reason kind of criteria. And I think the tendency is often to conflate these two. So if we mean by liberal values, I mean, freedom and accountability and things like that, then yes, all right? But their point of departure would be Sharia and that whole Sharia tradition, not Rawlsian liberalism, if that makes sense.
To me, this is a, to me, we constantly superimpose this on our analyses of Islam. And this, to me, is very problematic. I hope I answered your question.
Question Two: Maslaha vs Sharia Violations
Thank you, Professor Jackson. Wait, wait, wait, wait, remember, I can retroactively. I know, I know.
Okay. Here's my old advisor. Not old, not old.
Okay. So I can retroactively. Thank you for that presentation.
It was very interesting. And so one question I have is, so, and I think you might have touched, you probably did touch on this, but would you think it's fair to say that with Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, they're, in critiquing Daesh, ISIS, their focus is more on maslaha or the common good. You mentioned the moral dimension, but it seems that more of their focus is on maslaha or the common good, whereas the open letter to al-Baghdadi and Mohammed al-Yaqoubi's work seems to be focused more on where they violated Sharia principles.
There is some maslaha there, but it seems like their focus is what, the laws of Sharia that were violated. Would you think that's a fair assessment? And then why do you think there's that difference?
Professor Jackson's Response:
Well, I would, I would, I would, I'm gonna be careful because all this is being recorded again. I would say that the letter to Baghdadi goes beyond simply the micro-detailed sort of violations of specific provisions of Sharia.
It was also a call to reinstate the ulama, all right, to sort of a proper place of authority within Muslim community whereby they become the go-to, I mean, for all issues Islamic. The Gama'a doesn't quite agree with that, all right? And they have, in a sense, their own relationship with the Sharia tradition that is separate and distinct from that of the religious establishment, all right? And their maslahi approach is much, in a sense, more explicit and elastic, and this is one of the problems with it, than
the more sort of disciplined approach to that that we find among the religious establishment. So yeah, I see some distinctions between their two approaches.
But now, of course, as you know, the Gama'a may differ with the establishment on this or that detail, but agree with them on the general issue of condemning ISIS, and they might come together and issue something jointly or whatever. I don't know. But between that letter and the Gama'a's approach, I see that distinction, all right? Now, in their manifesto, they sound like Fuqaha, but they don't have the constraints of the Fuqaha.
What do I mean by that? I think we don't often recognize that, just like lawyers here, there's a legal culture, all right? And the Fuqaha are sort of bound by that legal culture. I remember here in Michigan, back in 1999, 2000, I think it was, we had a conference here. It was an organization that I was heading at the time, Sharia Scholars Association of North America.
And we had a big conference here in Detroit. And a number of bigwigs came from the Muslim world, including Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi. He was allowed in the country at that time.
And there was a controversial issue that came up about home mortgage and things like that. And I remember Sheikh Yusuf saying quite, I mean, it really impressed me. He said, okay, listen, you know, I have a controversial opinion here, all right? I have an opinion that a lot of people are not gonna like, okay, but I'm gonna express it anyway, because I've seen too many of my colleagues die with opinions still stuck in their breasts, okay? In other words, the legal culture, all right, would not allow for the expression of certain views, all right, the Gamay is freer from that.
So they can express those views more freely. It's not that the views themselves are a novel or alien. They just can express them with more explicitness and more freedom, because they're not bound by the same legal culture that many of the folk of Haar are.
Follow-up Question:
Quick follow-up, would you say then that what separates them then from ISIS is how they read not so much scripture, but geopolitical reality?
Professor Jackson's Response:
Yeah, but I think that they have a different understanding. I think this whole business of history is critical. Devising methodologies that are capacious enough to deal with this evolutionary energy, all right, without sort of degenerating into crass relativism, that's one of the challenges of Muslim Shari'i thinking in the modern world, right, to me.
I think that the Gamay goes part of the way, but there's still some issues that would need to be rectified with their particular approach. But to me, what's really interesting and in a sense important about the Gamay, and this is the aspect that I think that has gone completely unrecognized. When they first came out with the initiative to stop the violence, Ayman al-Zawahiri was in Afghanistan at
the time, and he sent a, what do you call it, a telegraph, he sent a message to the Gamay leaders, and the message was, ittaqullah.
In other words, like, fear God, shame on you, all right, you guys are capitulating. The Gamay's answer, brother, please. No, no, I mean.
Ayman, you are gonna preach to us? You, who are tortured and turn state's evidence, gonna preach to us, who spent 25, six years in prison, bums the word, we don't think so. So the street credibility that they have, all right, is extremely important. Recently, I talked to the son of a very prominent Muslim Brotherhood leader, who's now in prison, under Sisi's regime.
His son was actually shot at Rabat, all right, and was also in prison. So I asked him, so how's the Gamay Islamiyya doing? And he said to me, they are the most sophisticated on the scene right now, all right? And in the early period of the Morsi debacle, they said, okay, Muslim Brotherhood, you guys now have lost the presidency. Be careful that you don't lose the people.
I mean, this is the kind of sort of pragmatic manner of proceeding that they have still, very intimately tied to a Sharia tradition. But their street credibility, I think, is really important.
Question Three: Bullies and Hypocrisy
Thank you for an amazing talk. I have a million questions, and I'm only gonna ask two, because I wanna try to make it to the campus, Jumwai, in a few minutes. The first is a rephrase of Carla's question that takes the liberalism out of it, and asks about a kind of Trump reading with the idea that we are being recorded. Just to rephrase it, using your own words, a society of bullies that are easily bullied.
I guess I'd just like you to comment on the parallels in that. Carla, is that a useful rephrase of part of your question? Okay, and it's related to the question that I wanted to ask independently, which was about hypocrisy. Sheikh Tijani Sisay, the great Senegalese scholar, says that when, in commenting on Laikraha Fideen, when you force conversion upon someone, when you don't gain a believer, you gain a hypocrite.
And Ibn Khaldun's own words were a kind of historical critique of the problem that poses within Muslim civilization. So I guess I'd just like you to expand on those two points, the society of bullies that are also easily bullied, and the problem of hypocrisy, as you see it, as much, perhaps, as Ibrahim and Najjar see it, in contemporary Islamist discourse.
Professor Jackson's Response:
You know, it's, it's, it's, and I swear it's not a trap.
No, no, no, no, but it's amazing, I mean, just existentially sort of reflecting here how, on the one hand, how we are so very proud of lauding the degree of freedom that we control, and yet, in certain circumstances, we feel just as constrained, you know, as anybody in any third-world country, almost.
And I think that that's something for us to really seriously, seriously contemplate. Your question is a huge one, but I think that I would, in a sense, my interest would be in, you know, how this would apply, not to sort of Islamist movements worldwide, to be quite frank, I'm not as interested in them as, no, no, no, I'm not as interested in them as I am in how this plays out in an American context.
I mean, that's sort of my real forum, although I don't see, yeah, I mean, when we look at, I see a lot of crass pragmatism in the manner in which Muslims are, you know, are going about trying to deal with their issues. I mean, I've made certain statements, for example, about how I don't think that the American Constitution is in violation of, in the broad sense, don't get me wrong, in the broad sense, violation of Sharia, they're two different things, all right? And, you know, you get criticism, okay? President Trump comes out and issues a Muslim ban. What's the first thing somebody saying Muslims say? It's unconstitutional.
Both sides of their mouth. I mean, and not being in a position to understand, I do think that there's something related to the manner in which, you know, the sort of culture that autocracy sort of produces, all right, that there's a hypocrisy that functions as a survival mechanism, and it's so intense that we can't see it, all right? And I don't wanna go any farther than that, but I do see manifestations of that, and I think that it's one of our responsibilities, I mean, in as humane and brotherly and sisterly a manner as we can, you know, to point this out. This is a very, very unhealthy, unhealthy phenomenon, and I think that what Muslims have to understand, non-Muslims can see it, so like Nietzsche said, you know, my genes is in my nostrils.
I can smell it a mile away, and they can. And I think this is extremely problematic. Muslims have to state who they are, what they are, what they stand for, and be willing to pay the price for what that means.
Hypocrisy will not do them any good. And I do see manifestations of a sort of crass pragmatism.
Question Four: The Tragic Diversion
Professor Asani is, he's dying to say something.
Yeah, I just wonder if I may follow up. One of the things I learned from your wonderful presentation in the critique of ISIL and extremism from the point of view of the Muslim world is that ISIL and other radical groups seem to be a tragic diversion from the potential of Islam and the Muslim world to offer something to the world that the world really needs. I reflect on that a little bit, perhaps more than I do on the application of this to America, because I am in touch with various parts of the Muslim world and I know the enormous goodwill and potential there is.
And the preoccupation with violence, with security issues about Islam, I see as a tragic distraction from what is really the case. I don't know, I caught some of this in your presentation.
Professor Jackson's Response:
Yeah, I mean, the Gemara themselves in their earlier self-critique, they are very, very explicit about that.
We were part of the problem, they are saying. We kept our state and our society preoccupied with all these issues of violence and security, et cetera, to the point that it had no or diminished energies to devote to other things. And we ourselves were not aware of the civilizational dimensions of Islam and what it can contribute to the world that we were so preoccupied sort of with violence.
So that is a part of their outlook. Let me just say one thing about this whole business of when Professor Ware was asking me the question, I said my primary focus is on America. I'm not talking about any kind of American exceptionalism.
And I don't mean I have no connections with the Muslim world. But I think one of the things that I see, and let me just speak frankly here, all right, as a black American convert to Islam, I see what is going on now in the context of a history in which Islam enjoyed a certain prestige, legitimacy, indigeneity in the black community in America that it has progressively lost over the past two decades. And I see that as a tragedy, both for Islam and America.
And so for me, restoring that as part of what you were talking about, yesterday, in a way that positions Muslims to be looked at as valued interlocutors in the American project. If that, what is it? Yeah, the indigeneity, my own word. If that indigeneity is lost, all right, which is it's constantly being lost, to the point that Muslim now doubles for immigrant.
I mean, that makes others work, that does that work for them. They don't have to do anything else. So USA, USA, USA sounds like what? No Muslim, no Muslims, no Muslims.
This is tragic. So addressing that issue is one of my major concerns. I'm not saying I have no interest in what goes on in the Muslim world or in the relationship between Muslim world and the West.
But just as a priority, we talk about the ummah a lot. And somehow, America or American Muslims, as part of the ummah, does not quite make it into that construct. That's one of my concerns.
Final Question: Availability of Similar Work
So perhaps we could just take one more and then we'll have to close. Yes, an easy one. All right, so at the risk of being a walking stereotype and more white kids studying security issues, and I don't think we hear critiques like these enough.
This is something very new to me and very unique, actually. I'm not familiar with anything else like this. And in my studies, I have not heard of anything like this.
Is there other stuff like this out there?
Professor Jackson's Response:
There's a book that was published a couple of years ago. It's called Sadat's Assassins and the Renunciation of Political Violence. It was written by this guy, I think his name is Jackson, I think is his name.
So there's a whole book out there on this. It's on the Gamal Islamiyah and this very enterprise. I'm considering, they produce four manifestos.
I'm considering applying for a grant to do the others and do a whole bunch of them. I don't know about now, CCC is just a little. But this is why I did it, to be quite frank.
Okay, and I started this when I was here at Michigan. And we were reading some of this stuff in some of my graduate seminars. And my students were like, I mean, they couldn't believe it.
And they said, why is this not more accessible to the general American readership? So I felt that, and this would also contribute to that whole American discourse as well. But I don't know, I mean, why is there not more work on this kind of thing? And by the way, they have influenced de-radicalization movements in Saudi Arabia, in Libya. In Egypt itself, and this has been going on since 1997.
I don't know where this is going, however. The situation in Egypt is very, very touchy. As I said, one of their members, leaders, was re-imprisoned and he died in prison.
So far as I understand, the Gamal is holding on to this initiative to stop the violence. But I think that, and this may be one of the, I mean, I don't do the political science thing, but I'm speaking aloud in terms of what I do know. I worry about what the present administration may contribute to autocratic leaders in the Muslim world sense that they can jail, torture, et cetera, with impunity.
Because these jails are factories for jihadis. They are veritable factories for jihadis. They emerged out of that very experience.
Baghdadi's another one. And if this, this is not a solution. This is like taking aspirin for AIDS.
It's not gonna work. And it's gonna produce the opposite effect. And I really do worry about that.
I really worry about that. Because when these young guys get going, it's gonna be a long night. No, no, no, it's gonna be a long night.
Self-perpetuating. Especially the Egyptians. I'll say this as just a personal anecdote.
I mean, I lived in Egypt for a number of years. I got to know the Egyptians. I love Egypt, I love Cairo.
I was in Tahrir Square the night of the runoff between Morsi and Shafiq, you remember that? And I was right down there in Tahrir Square. And they were handing out little leaflets saying, ala juthati, over my dead body. And I'm telling you, I'm an Egyptian as I had known for years.
All of a sudden, I didn't know them. There was a different energy and they meant it. It scared me to death.
This stuff is real. It has real explosive capabilities, right? And I just hope that we learn some lessons and that this kind of discourse gets an opportunity to speak and be heard by people who could really make a difference. Thank you.
END OF LECTURE
Complete Academic Transcript - 21 Pages University of Michigan Conference Presentation Professor Sherman Jackson, USC